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LECTURE
UNCONDITIONAL RELATIONSHIPS
SAUL LEVMORE*
While much of private law is about the beauty of bargains, a fair
amount of public law is about suppressing those private bargains that a
legislature, a group of judges, or others among us disfavor. We do not
permit even the most sophisticated parties to allow themselves to be tor-
tured by the police or enslaved for their debts. Indeed, a fair fraction of
legal scholarship concerns the exaltation of private bargains on the one
hand, and arguments for their regulation on the other. When market fail-
ures or other circumstances suggest something other than pure private
ordering, a legal ban on such ordering and its enforcement is an impor-
tant but rather extreme option. The focus of this Lecture is, at least in
part, on legally unsuitable bargains. My subject, however, includes not
such things as self-enslavement and other tragic choices, but rather the
bargains that define inclusion in communities or other relationships.
Among other things, I aim to show that our legal system and our cultural
norms work to exclude an interesting set of bargains concerning commu-
nity membership, or inclusion in relationships more generally. The part
of the argument that dwells on cultural norms suggests that we collective-
ly appreciate the danger of bargains that can be destructive of communi-
ty. The legal argument, however, is somewhat irresolute. Although
courts and other legal institutions sometimes bar the kinds of bargains I
explore, using constitutional language, for example, it is also the case that
law enables evasions of just such judicial and regulatory obstacles.
Part I identifies several representative unsuitable bargains and uncov-
ers what I describe as something of a communitarian structure in our
legal system and in our private lives. Part II offers a diversion on the
subject of unconstitutional conditions, a legal category that can itself be
seen as defining unsuitable legislative bargains. Part III reaches for an
* Brokaw Professor of Law and Albert Clark Tate, Jr. Professor, University of
Virginia. An earlier version of portions of this Lecture, entitled Unsuitable Bargains,
was presented on March 18, 1996 as a part of the Distinguished Lecturer series at the
Boston University School of Law. I am grateful for that occasion, for the hospitality
and intellectual excitement to which I was there treated, and for specific comments
received there or elsewhere from Ron Cass, Clay Gillette, Wendy Gordon, Deirdre
Long, Fred Schauer, Ken Simons, George Triantis, and Rip Verkerke, and from the
participants at a faculty workshop at the University of Virginia.
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ancient text in order to emphasize the customary and deep-seated nature
of norms about inclusion in relationships.
I. GATEKEEPING
Inasmuch as a good part of my story is about the tension between com-
munal ideals and otherwise advantageous arrangements, I find it useful to
focus on gatekeeping and, in particular, the terms of admission to various
communities. The intuitive idea that drives this focus is that a communi-
ty's egalitarian norms, enforced by restrictions on bargains and remedies,
generate pressures to restrict admission to the community.1 My story is
about these egalitarian norms and the gatekeeping that goes on in their
shadow. What gives the story some plot is that people are creative in
bargaining around or otherwise avoiding restrictions they find inconve-
nient. I begin with immigration law because it incorporates obvious and
large-scale gatekeeping rules. I then turn to university admissions, em-
ployment, and other arenas to reflect on the relationship among commu-
nal norms, admissions policies, and avoidance techniques.
A. Immigration Bargains
1. Unsuitable Immigration
Consider the likely political coalitions in most developed countries with
respect to immigration policy. In the United States, for example, a signif-
icant minority of the population believes that we ought to open our gates
and admit many more new residents and potential citizens than we do
now.' Some of these convictions arise from the economic and political
conditions in source countries,3 and others stem from free trade argu-
ments supporting policies that would increase the mobility of labor, even
when there are problems of displacement and of strategic behavior by
other countries.' Some of our greatest historical gains in competitiveness
1 There are, of course, many reasons why members of a community might choose
to restrict entry. The point here is simply that some voters would be more inclined to
admit new members if they could restrict these new members' rights, mobility, and
economic options.
2 See, e.g., JULIAN L. SIMON, THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF IMMIGRATION
357-61 (1989) (presenting and discussing the results of informal polls of economists
and other social scientists in which significant numbers of the respondents indicated
that increased immigration would have a positive effect on society).
3 See, e.g., Alan 0. Sykes, The Welfare Economics of Immigration Law, in JUSTICE
IN IMMIGRATION 158, 161 (Warren F. Schwartz ed., 1995) (noting that although re-
strictions on immigration may benefit low-wage workers in the United States, they
will have a detrimental effect on similarly situated workers abroad (citing Kirit S.
Parikh, Chronic Hunger in the World: Impact of International Policies, in 1 THE POLIT-
ICAL ECONOMY OF HUNGER 114, 140-42 (Jean Dr~ze & Amartya Sen eds., 1990))).
4 See, e.g., SIMON, supra note 2, at 307-10 (concluding that immigration should be
increased despite some detrimental effects on native employment).
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and cultural achievement are, after all, associated with unidirectional
waves of immigration.5 On the other side, however, there is no shortage
of domestic interests and citizens opposed to increased immigration.6
This opposition usually arises from concerns about displacement costs
7
and about the value of creating a polity-with the expectation that other
nations will do the same-that maximizes its own well-being rather than
an aggregation of the welfare of all residents on earth. The idea is that
free movement and trade of the kind we enjoy among states in our union
is not necessarily a good model for similar openness among all countries.
There are, of course, other important perspectives on immigration policy.
For example, some citizens are relatively agnostic about the absolute lev-
el of immigration, but have strong views, in a variety of directions, about
the composition of the admittees. These other views include the idea, to
which I return below, that we might somehow agree on a level of immi-
gration and then auction admission to the highest bidders.'
In any event, my immediate focus is only on the point that among
many possible outcomes, we can think of the (ever-changing) details of
immigration law as reflecting a temporary political compromise between
those who would, very roughly speaking, increase our quotas and those
who would decrease them. The question, then, is why a better, mutually
5 See MALDWYN ALLEN JONES, AMERICAN IMMIGRATION 293-302 (2d ed. 1992)
(discussing the positive effects of immigration on American industry, politics, and cul-
ture).
6 See, e.g., PETER BRIMELOW, ALIEN NATION 94-95 (1995) (citing a number of
polls in which a majority of respondents were opposed to increased immigration).
Because there is also some suggestion that a majority of voters would prefer to de-
crease immigration, see, e.g., Susan Crabtree, Immigration Crossroads, INSIGHT ON
THE NEWS, Mar. 25, 1996, at 18, 19 (referring to a recent poll that found 79% of
respondents favoring 600,000 or fewer immigrants annually), the current level of im-
migration may say something interesting about the power of interest groups or legisla-
tors' preferences. On the other hand, constituents' stated preferences are often at
odds with enacted legislation, and this is hardly the place to consider when this is most
likely and whether it reflects an acute agency problem. In any event, because the
level of immigration-with egalitarian rules for all citizens, old and new-is not terri-
bly relevant to what follows, I put aside the precise preferences of voters and the
agency costs they confront. One way or another, the legislated level of immigration
must surely involve something of a compromise.
I See GEORGE J. BORIAS, FRIENDS OR STRANGERS 79 (1990) ("The presumption
that immigrants have an adverse impact on the labor market continues to be the main
justification for policies designed to restrict the size and composition of immigrant
flows into the United States.").
8 See, e.g., SIMON, supra note 2, at 329-35 (recommending the auctioning of visas);
Sykes, supra note 3, at 188 (suggesting that "simply charging the immigrant a fee for
admission" might yield greater gains than the program of providing visas to those with
the capital to launch new businesses in the United States); Gary S. Becker, An Open
Door for Immigrants-the Auction, WALL ST. J., Oct. 14, 1992, at A14 (arguing in
favor of auctioning off immigration visas to the highest bidders).
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more advantageous bargain does not dominate this compromise. A larg-
er coalition than the one that enacted existing law could agree to raise
our legal immigration levels on the condition that these additional new-
comers pay for the valuable spots they seek. Although the question is
why this has not happened, it might be useful to dwell on the apparent
political attraction of this proposal. Voters who prefer more permissive
immigration will favor raising the level;9 voters or legislators who grudg-
ingly compromised for the present level might agree to an increase in
immigration in return for compensation, more easily paid to the country
rather than to individual voters; and voters who preferred a market
mechanism in the first place would likely prefer some use of such a polit-
ical-market mechanism rather than its complete absence. I cannot, of
course, prove in any rigorous way that a large majority would vote to
allow additional immigrants, as part of what we might think of as a bifur-
cated immigration scheme, if these additional immigrants paid some
political-market-clearing price.' ° It is possible, after all, that as a higher
price induced more voters to approve, it would offend even more voters
who might, for instance, prefer not to be part of a system that admitted
only those who could better afford to pay. However, the same theoretical
uncertainty is present in most markets; we are generally willing to assume
that, absent surprising empirical evidence, payments encourage some
marginal actors without discouraging even more inframarginal ones.1'
If immigrants could defer payment for these visas or citizenship spots
or could tender payment in a variety of forms, the demand for admission
spaces would surely grow and, in turn, the subsequent increase in the
9 Some commentators join these voters. See, e.g., SIMON, supra note 2, at 301 (rec-
ommending, a substantial increase in the level of immigration). Note also that the sale
or auction of visas could increase the political palatability of increased immigration.
See id. at 331 (contending that an auction plan would make immigration more popu-
lar); Barry R. Chiswick, The Impact of Immigration on the Level and Distribution of
Economic Well-Being, in THE GATEWAY: U.S. IMMIGRATION ISSUES AND POLICIES
289, 308-10 (Barry R. Chiswick ed., 1982) (claiming that the sale of visas would enable
the native population to capture more of the gains from immigration and therefore
the political will to issue a larger number of visas).
1o I do think, however, that additional immigration, with classification, is likely to
be a Condorcet winner, preferred by a simple majority over every other alternative in
pairwise competition.
11 Thus, hiring Red Cross workers is not thought to be counterproductive because
of the reduction in the number of volunteers who are then likely to seek employment.
In a vaguely similar fashion, voters who are happy to admit x immigrants per year are
likely to accept x+1 in return for some payment from the one. Although it may be
that once these voters accept this payment they will prefer a more complete market
system in which all immigrants pay, reducing the market clearing number below x,
and although prescient pro-immigration voters may oppose the x+1 plan in the first
place, both can be said of the Red Cross example and neither seems likely to derail
such a plan.
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market-clearing price would make it even more popular to offer these
spots for sale. It is interesting and perhaps critical to the point I am
building toward that to the extent that current immigration law does in
fact sell certain entry slots, by way of preferences in the granting of immi-
grant visas to people who have outstanding credentials or training12 and
to those who can commit one million dollars in investment capital to a
commercial enterprise that will employ at least ten U.S. citizens,'" the
purchase price, in terms of skills or capital, is observable at the outset.
Both demand and domestic political willingness might increase if poten-
tial immigrants who lacked financial resources could compete on an equal
footing with those who happen to have the means in hand. The most
obvious way to do this would be to allow promises of future payment. 14
In short, we can imagine a proposal to admit additional immigrants on
terms that make such admissions more attractive to many of the very
voters least inclined to raise immigration rates. Such a proposal would be
the product of two separate bargains: domestic interests reaching a polit-
ical bargain to bifurcate admission, and potential immigrants then "agree-
ing" to be admitted on those terms. These bargains might yield a new set
of immigrants, perhaps admitted on the condition that they will be sub-
ject to higher future income tax rates than other residents and citizens. 5
One can even imagine a more extreme bifurcation in which the host
country simply holds a kind of tournament, offering conditional visas or
citizenship rights to some number of people per year, but turning these
into permanent rights only for some percentage of the applicants deemed
most "successful" in a five-year or other trial period. Such a tournament
would provide maximum information to the organizer, in this case the
country deciding on new citizens, and would allow applicants to compete
even though they were initially without financial resources. In order to
12 See 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(1)(A)-(B) (1.994) (allocating immigrant visas for those
with "extraordinary ability" or who are "outstanding" professors or researchers); id.
§ 1153(b)(2) (setting aside visas for aliens who have advanced degrees or who possess
"exceptional ability"); id. § 1153(b)(3) (allocating visas for, among others, "skilled"
and "professional" workers).
13 See id. § 1153(b)(5) (allocating visas for immigrants seeking to enter the United
States for the purpose of investing at least one million dollars in a new commercial
enterprise that will create full-time employment for at least ten United States citizens
or lawful aliens).
1' See infra note 30.
15 After delivering this Lecture, I was fortunate to come across a July 16, 1996 draft
of an article by Howard F. Chang entitled Immigration as International Trade: Eco-
nomic Welfare and the Optimal Immigration Policy (unpublished manuscript, on file
with the Boston University Law Review). Professor Chang develops a case for opti-
mal charges, or visa fees, taking into account both revenue and raising and economic
welfare. My own emphasis is more on political feasibility, the possibility of charging
penniless applicants through deferred liabilities, and the more general question of
apparently unsuitable bargains.
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make either bifurcation proposal more attractive to domestic interest
groups, the revenues raised could be earmarked for particular pro-
grams. 16
Tournaments of the kind just sketched are not unknown. Most work-
places lacking tenure and civil service protection are essentially tourna-
ment sites, with the rules of the game hidden at the outset, but where
applicants often receive either promotions or dismissals after a proving
period. 7 On the other hand, there are settings in which such tourna-
ments seem unacceptable. I turn to this contrast below, 8 but for now the
point is that there is something puzzling about the absence of a coalition
or serious proposal for this sort of bifurcated immigration policy. The
puzzle lies in our unwillingness to sell something we have that others
want desperately; in our disinclination, when we are willing to resort to
the market, to expand demand by offering to finance purchases; and in
the apparent failure of interest groups and politicians to bargain for such
an immigration policy when there are terms that would satisfy both those
who prefer more open borders and those who fear the economic costs
and redistributive effects of increased immigration. The narrower puzzle
is current law. Since 1994, we have allocated fifty-five thousand visas an-
nually by lottery to applicants from so-called "low-admission coun-
tries,"' 9 and several million people have entered this lottery each year. 0
16 The benefits could flow to the groups whose votes were needed for passage.
Note that earlier immigration patterns, in which many immigrants who experienced
financial difficulties returned to their places of origin, may be seen as reflecting such a
tournament scheme but with no cross-payments to the likely losers.
17 See MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.27, at 138-39 (1994)
(discussing probationary periods and their effects). Unfortunately, employees may be
in for surprises as to which skills eventually earn rewards. In contrast, the immigra-
tion-law tournament that I imagine has specified rules. Note, however, that tourna-
ments are likely to be efficient in those circumstances in which there is enough infor-
mation about output to structure a set of prizes, but not so much easily obtained
information as to support more direct incentives for performance.
18 See infra Part I.B.1 (showing how in universities and law schools, competition
exists at the admissions stage and after graduation, but the schools strive for egalitari-
anism among current students).
19 These "diversity" visas are provided for in 8 U.S.C. § 1153(c) (1994). The first
annual drawing, a "transitional diversity" program that began in October 1991, for
40,000 visas on a first-come, first-served basis, permitted, perhaps through neglect,
multiple applications by single individuals and attracted an estimated 20 million appli-
cations. See 3 INTERNATIONAL IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY LAW at U.S.-IV-10
(Dennis Campbell ed., 1993 & Supp. 2 Oct. 1994). This experience generated changes
in the forms of random selection and a limitation of one entry per applicant. 3 id.
The diversity program became permanent in 1994, making 55 thousand immigrant
visas available each year to natives of certain countries that have been determined to
have a low level of immigration to the United States in the previous five years. See 8
U.S.C. § 1153(c) (providing for the diversity program); id. § 1151(e) (setting the
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In addition to this lottery, we give preference to those with special skills
and even to those who have already won the tournament of economic
life, as it were, because, as already noted, we give priority to those with
stellar r6sum6s and to those who can offer investment capital and job
opportunities to other Americans. 21 These preferences, both in the Unit-
ed States and in other countries,2 2 limit our ability to explain law and
practice with a claim that the use of market mechanisms in this context
would be unseemly or immoral. On the contrary, when we do resort to
the market, we do so in an unnecessarily anti-egalitarian fashion, because
"on-site" tournaments would make these preferences available to those
who did not already possess money or education.
2. Community Norms and the Immigration Puzzle
We seem to have a collective distaste for managing competitions that
lead to the prize of citizenship even though we, like other countries,
award the very same prize on the basis of lotteries and competitions that
occur outside our gates.28 I call it a "distaste" because, as a functional
matter, competitions hold considerable attraction. I refer to this distaste
as applying only to competitions within our "gates" because we award
preferences on the basis of a competition that takes place earlier, outside
these borders or gates. 24 Our scheme creates a kind of preliminary com-
petition to amass the skills or capital necessary for our law's preferences.
It seems fair to say that although our system readily excludes applicants
who are outside the gates and sponsors competitions among them for
rights of entry, it is far more hesitant to experiment with internal compe-
titions or even to expend substantial resources in excluding illegal
"losers" who are already inside these somewhat metaphorical gates. The
number of diversity immigrants at 55 thousand). However, even these visa recipients
must have some minimal education or skill training. See id. .§ 1153(c)(2).
20 See State Dept. Releases Visa Lottery Results, 72 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1087,
1087-88 (1995) (reporting 4.5 million qualified entries for fiscal year 1996); 6.5 Million
Aliens Apply for Diversity Program; Notification of Winners Begins, 71 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 1226, 1226 (1994) (reporting approximately 6.5 million qualified entries for
fiscal year 1995).
21 See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
22 See BORJAS, supra note 7, at 202-04 (noting the preferences of Canada and Aus-
tralia for educated or skilled immigrants).
23 Note that I mean "outside" our physical borders and not simply outside immi-
gration law. Cf Linda S. Bosniak, Membership, Equality, and the Difference that
Alienage Makes, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1047, 1059-63 (1994) (discussing the "inside-
outside" distinction conventionally employed by immigration scholars in which "in-
side" refers to the treatment of aliens by immigration law itself and "outside" refers
to the treatment of aliens by other areas of the law).
24 The gates metaphor is imperfect, of course, because the immigration lottery is
available to noncitizens already found within our borders and because there is some
grey area between visa holder and citizen status.
1996]
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system reflects a distaste for markets and other competitive institutions
only when we would have to manage them domestically. This difference
between the legal and cultural norms applied inside our country or com-
munity and the norms applied to outsiders, whom we identify in simple
terms and even in the sense of physical absence, is familiar in the law of
criminal procedure.25 There is, however, something especially interesting
about the apparent inside-outside distinction in competition for inclusion,
or membership, because it seems much more a matter of sensibility than
function or necessity.
In the immigration context, it is not entirely clear whether the obstacles
to competition within the community's boundaries are cultural or legal.
In either case, their foundation could be either functional or moral. It
may be that bargains of the kind suggested do not exist because enough
of us recoil at the idea of deporting fellow residents merely for losing
some economic tournament, especially when bad luck might have affect-
ed performance. It is a bit more difficult, though, to posit that we do not
admit new citizens on the condition that they pay higher tax rates because
we find that sort of differential terribly offensive. It is possible that be-
cause some bifurcated arrangements make us uncomfortable, we adopt a
cultural norm that is overbroad and hostile to bifurcated arrangements in
general.2 6
There is a venerable philosophical argument or tradition in favor of the
inside-outside distinction-in physical terms, more or less-and opposed
therefore to internal bifurcation. This perspective defines communities
by their ability to set the rules of admission and to treat unadmitted out-
siders less generously, but also by their obligation to treat insiders in an
egalitarian fashion.27 To the extent that it is this sort of argument that
causes us to vote and even to recoil as we do, it is somewhat surprising to
find overbroad compliance with its terms. An immediate and practical
25 See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 670 (1992) (holding
that the defendant's forcible abduction from Mexico by Mexican agents on behalf of
the United States Drug Enforcement Agency did not prohibit his trial in the United
States for violations of this country's criminal laws).
26 1 turn below to situations in which such arrangements appear acceptable. See
infra Part I.B.2.
27 See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 195-216 (1986) (discussing the "associa-
tive obligations" that exist within a community); MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUS-
TICE 60-61 (1983) (arguing that political justice requires that "the process of self-de-
termination through which a democratic state shapes its internal life, must be open,
and equally open, to all those men and women who live within its territory, work in
the local economy, and are subject to local law"); Bosniak, supra note 23, at 1053-55
(discussing the debate over whether restrictions on the rights of immigrants constitute
discrimination on the basis of alienage); Sykes, supra note 3, at 159 (observing that
because illegal aliens "participate only minimally in entitlement programs, do not
vote, and usually pay taxes much like other workers, it is by no means clear that their
presence should be viewed as a 'problem"').
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problem of application involves finding the point at which to grant mem-
bership or insider status. Mere physical presence is an unattractive trig-
ger because tourists and illegal entrants have not met the standards set by
the community for admission. One argument equates insider status with
the grant of citizenship; another includes permanent residents in the in-
sider circle, perhaps because to do otherwise is to permit their exploita-
tion; and yet another argument calls for a kind of sliding arrangement in
which longer or more permanent presence brings increased rights of
equal treatment.28
As for the legal unsuitability of bargains, it may be that political bar-
gains regarding immigration rules are not of the kind suggested here be-
cause our courts would not tolerate their enforcement-perhaps because
courts adopt one of the philosophical positions I just sketched. For exam-
ple, even though unequal tax burdens are rarely challenged in litigation
and present a most unlikely candidate for judicial rejection of legislative
decisionmaking, we can be fairly confident that our courts would disallow
a classification of citizens for tax purposes of the kind that I have just
outlined.29 Oddly enough, the likely judicial reaction to yet more brutal
28 See Bosniak, supra note 23, at 1054-55 (raising questions about the law's varying
treatment of alien status and its effect on the allocation of rights and benefits in our
society).
One provocative approach to the insider-outsider distinction is to have constitu-
tional protections follow government powers, so that if the government has the consti-
tutional power to act against someone's interests, then the person has constitutional
protections. This is the position sometimes taken by Gerald Neuman. See, e.g., GER-
ALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION 121 (arguing for qualifications
on the government's power to exclude or expel aliens), 132 (noting that lawful resi-
dents incur reliance in the form of personal ties and contending that the government
should respect this reliance). It seems likely that this argument requires additional
distinctions: Our government may, for instance, have the constitutional and other
power to wage war, but it seems unlikely that Professor Neuman would think that our
Supreme Court could or ought to intervene on behalf of enemy citizens who desire to
assert their right to speak against or be compensated for property losses caused by
this war. In any event, the distinction suggested in the text requires only a recognition
of the likelihood that judicial disapproval is more likely if we try to exclude someone
who has established many ties to the community. This likelihood is consistent with
Neuman's approach.
29 Although there is no case addressing the question of conditional, bifurcated citi-
zenship, Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 249 (1964), explains "that there is no second
or third or fourth class of citizenship," and Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168-69
(1964), holds that limiting the rights of naturalized citizens more than native born
citizens creates an impermissible second-class citizenship. The legal barriers are un-
likely to apply to charges levied as tariffs at the time entry is granted. See generally
Chang, supra note 15 (discussing tariffs, quotas, and legal impediments). On the oth-
er hand, there is a rule discriminating in favor of natural born citizens where the office
of the President is concerned. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 ("No person except a natu-
ral born Citizen ... shall be eligible to the office of the President .... ").
1996]
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bargains is perhaps more, rather than less, difficult to predict. In the case
of the tournament idea, history suggests that most of the losers would
voluntarily depart when their conditional visas expired. If we had the will
and means to locate those who remained illegally, I doubt whether courts
would block their forced exit.
It is interesting that even when nonlawyers and nonphilosophers sug-
gest marketplace norms for immigration law, their most radical sugges-
tions do not contemplate deportation. For example, Gary Becker's call
for auctioning off slots takes the number of such immigrant places as po-
litically determined or given, and then notes that commercial lenders
might be willing to finance able applicants."0 There is, however, no dis-
cussion of the role law would play in making such a capital market func-
tion. Borrowers might agree up front to leave the country if they default,
but the question is whether the legal system would support such private
ordering. In the absence of this sort of penalty, there is reason to think
that private lenders would rarely agree to finance immigrants.31 In any
event, the cultural norms that weigh against deportation, or in favor of
limiting serious tournaments to locations outside our gates, are either
deeply ingrained-even in a free thinker like Gary Becker-or presumed
to be an inviolable part of our legal system.
As the title of this Part suggests, I am more comfortable thinking about
communities and their admission and exclusion policies in terms that I
have labeled cultural and legal, than I am in thinking about them in philo-
sophical, moral, or economic terms. This preference derives from dis-
comfort with the idea that it might be morally preferable to exclude out-
siders as one wished, so long as one treated insiders equally, rather than
to admit desperate outsiders to an inferior class of membership that they
and insiders might all agree to in advance. Our taste for egalitarian mem-
bership, as it were, might be indefensible in moral and economic terms
and yet appealing to our cultural and legal sensibilities. In particular,
there is a good case, in both moral and functional terms, for preferring a
domestically managed tournament to the schemes represented in present
30 See Becker, supra note 8, at A14 (suggesting the availability of commercial loans
for "highly reliable immigrants"). It is also interesting that Becker does not suggest
accepting promises of future payments from buyers, although he does allow for the
possibility that commercial lenders will perform this arbitrage function. Others, how-
ever, are willing to consider the future payment route. See SIMON, supra note 2, at
333 (suggesting that immigrants pay large entry fees over time along with their federal
income tax); Chiswick, supra note 9, at 309 (same). An additional question is what
protection such lenders could receive. If commercial lenders were made secure by the
exclusion of defaulting borrowers from the country, then we can imagine commercial
lenders as intermediaries who would assess the future earning power of applicants in a
somewhat depoliticized way.
31 At the very least, financiers would probably require a share of any upside re-
turn, and this itself creates a variety of agency and enforcement problems.
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immigration law. Current law refuses to organize a tournament of its
own, and thus merely shifts what we will not do within our own borders
to an earlier time and another place, 2 discriminating against some appli-
cants and sacrificing valuable information. In return, we are able to char-
acterize our nation, or community, as kinder and gentler, and perhaps
even to construct philosophical theories that rationalize most of our rules.
The more ex post the sorting process, or tournament, the more brutal the
rejection step seems to those who have already arrived. This perceived
brutality is, in turn, destructive of community. It goes almost without
saying that this inclination to push tournaments to unseen venues may
seem anything but humane to those in dire straits elsewhere.
3. Norm Evasion
Formal constraints on private ordering often generate informal markets
and institutions that serve to evade the constraints. These evasions ap-
peal to some observers and horrify others, but do not by their mere exist-
ence prove much about the wisdom of the original constraints."3 Public
resources spent on enforcement sometimes signal the degree to which so-
ciety as a whole supports or rejects the original constraints. In some set-
tings the evasions are communal, a situation that is particularly likely
when the constraints fall primarily on the government. In the case of
immigration law, even while legal and cultural norms or philosophical ar-
guments reject the creation of a second class of citizenry that must con-
tribute higher taxes or participate in a tournament to exclude losers or
deadbeats, legal and political institutions come close to creating such a
world.
One source of evasion is the grey area between exclusion, or outsider
status more generally, and citizenship. We grant a variety of categories of
visas, and there is necessarily some slippage when it comes to renewing
32 Thus, in Plyler v. Doe, the Court interpreted the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to mean that children of illegal aliens could not be excluded
from public schools. 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982); see also League of United Latin Am.
Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755 (C.D. Cal.) (enjoining the implementation and
enforcement of those parts of California's Proposition 187 that barred undocumented
immigrant children from public schools, excluded all undocumented aliens from non-
emergency state-funded medical services, and required social service providers to re-
port any alien applicant suspected of undocumented status to the Immigration and
Naturalization Service), aff'd sub nom. Gregorio T. v. Wilson, 59 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir.
1995).
33 By way of analogy, rent control laws may generate side payments to landlords
and may discourage tenants from moving. These effects seem to support the claims of
those who oppose rent control, but they do not dissipate all the advantages that sup-
porters of rent control see in such regulation. We expect mixed reactions in both
groups as to the morality of making side payments in order to obtain or retain a rent-
controlled apartment. Similar developments follow constraints on gambling, interest
rates, drug and alcohol use, and so forth.
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these visas or upgrading visa holders to citizenship status. People who
receive visas because they are engaged to marry U.S. citizens84 or because
they can arrive with substantial investment capital3" may be unable to
stay in the United States if misfortunes develop or plans change. 6 There
is, therefore, a sense in which these immigrants may seek citizenship but
find themselves in a kind of proving period of the very kind that the soci-
ety seems unwilling to offer more broadly.
The evasion-or reality-is most profound when we take illegal immi-
gration into account. Some fraction of our millions of illegal aliens will
prove themselves economically, politically, or socially and then, through a
variety of means, will be permitted to stay.37 By calling these entrants
"illegals" rather than "second class citizens," we manage to avoid seeing
ourselves as the sort of people who exploit the vulnerability of outsiders
by holding a formal competition within our borders. But I intend this as a
positive rather than a normative statement about current immigration
law. There is a kind of communitarian constraint on bargains and compe-
tition for citizenship, in that the legal and political systems prefer compe-
titions outside our gates in order to foster the sense of community or
egalitarian treatment within our borders. At the same time, our treat-
ment of illegal immigrants reflects the very sort of bifurcation that we
seem to find unacceptable and that is not even a very good substitute for
a more explicitly market-based or competitive system. The existing sys-
tem favors potential immigrants who can travel or walk to our borders
over others who would need to invest more to enter our competitions. It
also takes in less revenue and fewer of the skills and qualities we might
attract with an explicit system. The present implicit system does, howev-
er, allow us to maintain an enticing myth about our community.38 More-
over, it is hard to imagine an immigration system free of this tension. So
long as borders are not completely open but enforcement is imperfect,
bifurcation is virtually inevitable. The alternative would be to promise
"illegal" immigrants that once they enter our gates they will become full
citizens, because we wish to treat all people alike within our borders.
This would, in turn, further encourage border crossings, false tourism,
34 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(K) (providing a nonimmigrant classification for fi-
ancees or fiances of American citizens as well as for their minor children); id.
§ 1184(d) (establishing requirements for the issuance of visas to nonimmigrant fi-
ancees or fiances).
3r See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
36 See 8 U.S.C. § 1186b (providing for the termination of the resident status of
entrepreneurs admitted under § 1153(b)(5)); id. § 1184(d) (allowing the deportation
of aliens admitted under § 1184 for failure to marry within three months).
31 See, e.g., id. § 1255a (authorizing the adjustment of the status of certain illegal
aliens to that of temporary or permanent resident).
38 It is also consistent with the philosophical position noted earlier. See supra note
27 and accompanying text.
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and so forth. In short, there is a serious limit on our ability to reify our
collective distaste for competition of a certain kind.
B. Other Communities and Their Unsuitable Bargains
1. University Admissions
The immigration law pattern described in the previous Part is nicely
replicated in the context of admissions to universities. Although different
kinds of interest groups influence these two sets of admissions rules, their
similarities illustrate the utility of the communitarian perspective. In
both settings, formal restrictions keep certain kinds of competition
outside the "gates," allowing the community to see or describe itself as
egalitarian, but at some substantial functional and moral cost. In both
settings a pattern of evasion develops a kind of compromise, albeit one of
uncertain and nonuniform stability.
Most readers of this "Lecture" will find university practices familiar.
Although competitive admissions processes make modest use of valuable
information acquired once students and faculty 9 are inside the "commu-
nity," as when some master's degree students are selected for a doctoral
program, there has been a pronounced trend in elite universities toward
graduating most matriculants and limiting exclusion to the front end.
Colleges and law schools often advertise the high percentage of entering
students who complete the degree. In the case of law schools, for exam-
ple, performance during the first year of law school is almost certainly a
better predictor of future performance than is some combination of un-
dergraduate grades and scores on standardized exams, but law schools
have moved away from a system in which they culled many students after
one year of law school.40 Elite law schools in particular are highly selec-
tive at the front gates but dramatically egalitarian inside, if retention can
be fairly associated with nondiscrimination.4 Similarly, evidence of aca-
39 I will ignore faculty hiring, although it is noteworthy that it is generally thought
to be easier to be promoted from within a faculty than to be hired laterally from
another university.
40 See ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM
THE 1850S TO THE 1980s 221 n.38 (1983) (noting that, by the 1970s, failure had be-
come "rare" at the Harvard, Yale. and Notre Dame law schools).
41 There are some law schools that exploit the value of information generated by
performance in, rather than outside, law school, by inviting some applicants to a sum-
mer session prior to matriculation. See, e.g., Paul T. Wangerin, Law School Academic
Support Programs, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 771, 777 n.30 (1989) (describing the use of such
a program at John Marshall Law School). The session is in essence a competition for
admission, as well as a period in which potential students might gain information
about the study of law and the particular school. The winners join the mainstream
students, apparently but not surprisingly outperforming them, and the losers depart.
See id. A clever aspect of this atypical competition is that most of the community
avoids interaction with those who are forced to depart. Moreover, the competitive
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demic wrongdoing is likely to be fatal if known at the time of the admis-
sion decision, but many law schools are remarkably protective of students
who behave dishonestly once in law school.
Internal arrangements also exhibit an egalitarian flavor not found in
many other markets. Schools allocate dormitory rooms and limit places
in popular courses by lottery rather than auction. Students who major in
physics or classics typically pay the same tuition as those who study histo-
ry or sociology, even though the cost of educating is much higher when
the students require laboratory facilities and the classes are smaller.
Although tuition often varies among schools in a particular university,
this discrimination is less threatening to the egalitarian and intellectual
ambiance.
Again, the evasions and creeping market phenomena are unsurprising
and sometimes brutal. When cutbacks come, they often hit some depart-
ments more than others. At those times, it may seem that ongoing user
fees would be superior to an egalitarian structure followed by amputa-
tion. Graduate fellowships are more available and more generous in
some departments than in others. More interesting, perhaps, is the fact
that competition is present upon exit as well as entrance. Although many
graduates of identifiable programs will likely be unemployed, and many
may experience grave regret in having chosen the fields that their univer-
sities encouraged, the schools do not promise equal treatment in the post-
graduation period.42 The competition at both ends highlights the egalita-
rian nature of the university community.
In short, the admissions policies of elite schools resemble those of
wealthy countries. At the front gate, there is a serious tournament based
on imperfect information, as provided by standardized exam scores and
previously acquired skills or wealth, along with something of a lottery.
Within the community's gates, however, distinctions are frowned upon
and exclusion is almost out of the question. This communitarian perspec-
tive with regard to universities may be strengthened by the observation
that competitive admissions and high retention rates accompanied in-
creased diversity in the student population. Racial and other diversity
may have drawn attention to the purposeful construction of university
communities, and the maintenance of these communities was enhanced
by the admissions process and the promotion of egalitarian and perma-
nence norms once membership in the community was established.
Once again, a community's norms or preferences as to what bargains
atmosphere that might be expected during the trial period may be limited to that
summer session.
42 There was, however, a time when "tuition postponement" plans, under which
participants could elect to join a pool of classmates that repaid their aggregate loans
based on individuals' earnings, offered the option of a kind of post-graduation egalita-
rian norm. See generally D. BRUCE JOHNSTONE, NEW PATTERNS FOR COLLEGE
LENDING: INCOME CONTINGENT LOANS (1972).
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are suitable can easily make most outsiders and applicants worse off. Ap-
plicants may prefer the opportunity to prove themselves in the communi-
ty, at the risk of failure and exclusion, and the society at large might ben-
efit from better matching of applicants and institutions. However, we are
about as eager to fail out half of our students as we are to deport millions
of illegal aliens.
When serious competition exists among communities, as among univer-
sities but perhaps not among countries,"3 there is also a kind of race to
the bottom. If all competitors excluded numerous students, an innovator
might promise, perhaps implicitly, that it would not do so. Risk-averse,
highly qualified applicants might then gravitate toward this innovator.
Over time, all schools could be "forced" to promise high retention rates.
Put slightly differently, so long as applicants prefer graduation with low
grades to exclusion, the equilibrium will likely involve little exclusion.
One can imagine an equilibrium in which the most sought-after appli-
cants receive assurances of nonexclusion, so that competitors who prom-
ise to retain virtually all students cannot tempt them, while other appli-
cants face substantial risks of exclusion for subpar performance.
Applicants might sort themselves in a socially and privately desirable
manner in such a regime. Such schemes are not unknown," but the larg-
er point is that the general decline in failure rates in many university pro-
grams, including law schools, is not surprising.
On a less dramatic scale, we can say much of the same about grading
norms within schools. Harvard Law School may have ceased to exclude
many of its students, perhaps because other schools captured some of the
best applicants, but it continues to sort them with grades. Yale, on the
other hand, appears to compete with less sorting and a more communitar-
ian feel. But once again the egalitarian strategy can only be incomplete.
When there is less sorting by grades, there is likely to be more competi-
tion through other means for professors' attention and for their recom-
mendations.
A different, or coordinate, explanation for the evolution of grading and
exclusion policies in universities rests on the rising cost of education. As
tuitions rose, it may have become more difficult for even the most pres-
tigious schools to convince risk-averse applicants to invest where there
was a substantial risk of failure. Upstart schools may have used less com-
petitive grading policies in order to attract excellent applicants. Under
this view, current students pay for pre-enrollment screening in a way that
is consistent with the absence of any market failure. This explanation is
consistent with the continued failure, or at least drop-out, rate in doctoral
programs in the arts and sciences, in which tuition is often lower and in
'3 Although countries have something of a captive audience, their potential "cus-
tomers" are few in number and are choosing among eager countries.
11 For example, a graduate or sports program might promise a "no-cut" arrange-
ment to some applicants.
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which fellowships further reduce the investment required by students.
Moreover, in this market, universities have cleverly adapted the master's
degree to soften exit. This may be something that law and other profes-
sional schools could come to emulate. A one-year trial period could
serve the purposes of the school, because performance in the trial period
would be a better predictor of future performance than would undergrad-
uate grades and other information available at the outset. Students might
also prefer a trial period, so as to learn about the likelihood and compara-
tive advantages of various career options while gaining some certification.
It is interesting that in the employment market, lawyers, more than
recent recipients of doctoral degrees, are familiar with an analogous de-
velopment. One thing that makes the competition within elite law firms
attractive to associates and applicants is the prospect of good jobs with
those firms' clients, or with employers who resemble these clients, in the
event of exit.
2. Markets More Generally
I have compared countries and universities in order to make the point
that although a purely functional approach to certain kinds of gatekeep-
ing suggests testing periods or apprenticeships followed by serious sorting
and rejection, a taste for communitarian ideals can push some of this test-
ing to less efficient earlier and later periods, outside the borders of a par-
ticular community. There are, of course, other institutions suitable for
similar analyses, but it may be more useful to stress that when a commu-
nity is not captive, competitive pressures are likely to make this taste for
communitarianism too expensive to satisfy. Egalitarian pay scales may
drive highly prized but "undercompensated" employees elsewhere, egali-
tarian retention policies may cause customers to move their business to
suppliers who raise average performance by excluding subpar employees,
and so forth. In contrast, a country has a more captive audience and may
satisfy its communitarian sensibilities with a modest decrease in wealth
and no fear of collapse or extinction.
As a first example, consider an industry of non-standardized products
in which imitation is difficult. Restaurant patrons, for instance, are a
group that implicitly invites many new competitors, favors only a few, and
imposes serious costs on the many failures. Although most new restau-
rants shut down in short order, we think of this as socially efficient com-
petition. Indeed, any other means of economic organization for that sort
of industry would likely lead to grave corruption, inefficiencies, and injus-
tices. Restaurant patrons would need to be highly organized or centrally
controlled, in order to prevent defections, before communitarian sensibil-
ities in favor of protecting "inefficient" restaurants could be indulged.45
45 The analysis is similar if we view the matter from the perspective of restaurant
owners who are constrained in their desire to treat their own employees in more egal-
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A consideration of the arenas in which bifurcation is found brings this
distinction between captive audiences, or markets, and competitive indus-
tries into focus. Although my earlier discussion explored the egalitarian
norms attached to our conception of citizenship,46 it is also interesting to
think about communities that tolerate bifurcation. Labor unions, for ex-
ample, sometimes bargain for protections and wage schedules for existing
members while agreeing to less generous terms for new hires.47 The
union thus agrees to a bifurcated membership, allowing the employer to
discriminate in the way that an employer in an unconstrained competitive
market might. The union normally agrees to this arrangement not when
its bargaining position is strong, but rather when the threat of job losses
and of competition from nonunion competitors is most serious. Bifurca-
tion thus enters the picture just when competition threatens a captive
market.48
Most enterprises operate in a competitive environment but attempt for
profit-maximizing as well as noneconomic reasons to maintain a sense of
community within the firm. To the extent that this communitarian aspira-
tion is inconsistent with internal, exclusionary competition, the firm must
reach a compromise that takes into account the characteristics of employ-
ees, potential employees, and customers. Consider, for example, the puz-
zling comparison of egalitarian elite law schools and brutal, tournament-
style, elite law firms. If law schools appeal to risk-averse or interperson-
ally sensitive applicants by means of high retention rates and fuzzy grad-
ing systems, why is it that law firms deal with the same people, as associ-
ates, in a way that is even more competitive and tournament-like than
most other employers? Most solutions to this puzzle depend, I think, on
the competitive environment of law firms. Egalitarian retention and pay
scales would lead to the departures of prized attorneys and clients. If law
firms could use no lawyer for more than three years, I suspect that they
would be less tournament-like and more like law schools and clerkship
arrangements. Longer time horizons require firms to confront the ques-
tions of evaluation and retention, and thus create a more competitive en-
vironment. It is probably no accident that more egalitarian workplaces
for lawyers, including some faculties, civil service settings, and court-
itarian fashion than do their competitors by the fact that they must attract customers.
There is limited room for this preference.
46 See supra Part I.A.
47 For a labor law question arising out of a bifurcated agreement, see Air Line
Pilots Ass'n v. O'Neill, 499 U.S. 65 (1991) (holding that the Air Line Pilots Associa-
tion's settlement with Continental Airlines, including terms for striking union mem-
bers that were different from those to be offered to non-striking members, was not a
breach of the union's duty of fair representation).
48 Similarly, worker-managed firms often choose to admit non-participating em-
ployees in times of crisis.
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houses, face fewer competitive pressures because they are monopolistic
or not-for-profit institutions.
Even the most competitive environments do, however, appear to ab-
sorb the costs associated with avoiding certain unsuitable bargains. For
example, it is uncommon for law firms and other employers to offer indi-
vidual employees a choice between departure and demotion. Although
law firms have gravitated toward offering "permanent associate" status to
some disappointed partnership candidates, they will not tell a fifth-year
associate to look for work elsewhere or remain at the firm on the same
terms as a second-year associate.49 While the demoralization costs that
fall on this employee might be offset by yet a further reduction in salary,
the demoralization that other lawyers avoid by not finding such offers
suitable is analogous, if not identical, to the discomfort we collectively
avoid by not excluding unsuccessful fifth-year immigrants and first-year
law students. It is interesting, however, that such "demotion bargains"
are much more common when directed at a large group of employees.
Thus, a labor union might agree to a "giveback," and officers who stay on
in a period of military contraction might all receive a demotion. Such
group bargains can sometimes avoid the strategic behavior problem that
lurks behind individual offers,5" but a more telling difference is that the
equal treatment of a group need not threaten communitarian sensibilities.
Note, once again, the cost of the inevitable avoidance mechanisms
when there are communitarian influences on the suitability of bargains.
The more the hiring or promoting process is irreversible, the more law
firms and other employers will be inclined to hire temporary workers, to
make permanent associates rather than additional partners, to contract
out work that might have generated greater rewards for existing employ-
ees, and to take other steps that weaken community bonds. Law firms,
for example, might simply hesitate to make more partners that they could
not easily demote. An optimist would say that a firm is a type of commu-
nity and that within the boundaries of this community, some bargains are
customarily found unsuitable in order to promote morale or the commu-
nitarian ideal. This ideal may be enjoyed at low cost or may even contrib-
ute to morale in a way that is economically profitable. A cynic would say
that lawyers, among others, only feign the making of communities, and
49 Although some firms have recently developed two tiers of partnership, and
some schools offer disappointed tenure candidates untenured posts as administrators
or lecturers, it would again be surprising if these employees were told either to com-
pete all over again or to accept absolute and significant salary reductions.
50 An employee who is offered the choice between a layoff and a demotion cannot
be sure that the employer is not testing his reservation price. Thus, the fact that indi-
vidual employees bargain for increases in pay by threatening departure more often
than employers bargain for decreases in pay with corresponding threats is probably
explained by the asymmetry in information as to credible threats.
HeinOnline  -- 76 B. U. L. Rev. 824 1996
UNCONDITIONAL RELATIONSHIPS
that we fool ourselves by drawing arbitrary boundaries and imposing a
cultural taboo on bargains that would benefit many among us.
3. Marriage
The discussion to this point has blurred the line between formal and
informal constraints on certain anti-communitarian bargains. Nowhere
are customary and formal legal influences more intertwined than in the
rules pertaining to marriage.
We can best understand the relevance of marriage to the communitari-
an perspective on the suitability of bargains by thinking of unenforceable
marriage contracts. A might wish to marry B only if B promises to limit
visits by B's parents to two per year. Courts, however, will neither give A
damages nor grant rescission on breach of such an agreement. An econo-
mist would say that allowing and enforcing such bargains among con-
senting adults might lead to more marriages and certainly to more social
welfare. Lay people and courts, however, think otherwise. We view mar-
riage, like citizenship, as more than the sum of any and all voluntary bar-
gains. Because we see love and marriage as unconditional, more or less,
some bargains are deemed unsuitable. Of course, the availability of di-
vorce in modem law makes the rules about marriage itself somewhat less
important. Put differently, although we can explain the availability of di-
vorce in many ways, communitarian sensibilities are consistent with rules
making exit from a relationship, or "mini-community," either very easy
or very difficult. Still, the law's disinclination to enforce the terms of
marriages 56 is an example of an ethic exalting community or relational
bonds by rendering contradictory private bargains unsuitable.
Finally, even in eras when legal and cultural constraints regarding en-
forceable marital bargains had more bite because divorces were more dif-
ficult to obtain, the constraints were only partially effective. Parties
could, for example, avoid legal constraints by living together outside of
marriage. There is little point in dwelling on this example, however, be-
cause there are other explanations for the evolution of family law and
because I am not prepared to argue that all limits on private bargains and
remedies say something about the communitarian perspective in the ar-
rangement in question.
II. UNSUITABLE BARGAINS AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS
It is tempting to try to connect these unsuitable bargains with the rich,
51 See Saul Levmore, Love It or Leave It: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Ex-
clusivity of Remedies in Partnership and Marriage, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 221,
226 (1995):
Whether courts aim to encourage compromise with a love-it-or-leave-it rule or
simply refuse to monetize or otherwise become entwined in ongoing spousal rela-
tions, there is little doubt that this is an area of law where the expected outcomes
are limited to self-help, private negotiation, or the extreme step of dissolution.
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difficult literature on unconstitutional conditions. A government can
sometimes induce behavior by attaching conditions to benefits it offers,
but it can also go too far in the eyes of courts as it expands upon or
leverages its power in this manner. Courts will occasionally not permit
the government to link together two things that it could otherwise do
separately. However, the reach of the doctrine is notoriously difficult to
specify.52 Thus, conditioning immigration or welfare on beneficiaries'
agreeing to vote a certain way is surely unacceptable, 3 but legislation
that makes immigration or welfare contingent on beneficiaries' submit-
ting to random drug tests may or may not be acceptable.5 4 The conven-
tional wisdom is that such linkages enable the government to increase its
already formidable bargaining power.55 We might trust most bargains if
52 See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker, The Prices of Rights: Toward a Positive Theory of Un-
constitutional Conditions, 75 CORNELL L, REV. 1185, 1195-97 (1990) (discussing the
failure of recent scholarly attempts to present a positive theory of unconstitutional
conditions law); Richard A. Epstein, Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the
Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 5, 6 (1988) (stating that unconstitutional condi-
tions doctrine has "bedeviled courts and commentators alike" for more than a hun-
dred years); Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights
in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1298 (1984) (noting that the Supreme
Court has yet to adopt a coherent framework for analyzing alleged unconstitutional
conditions); Albert J. Rosenthal, Conditional Federal Spending and the Constitution,
39 STAN. L. REV. 1103, 1120 (1987) (describing the history of the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine as "convoluted" and asserting that "the general principles that
have evolved from that history are seldom useful in solving specific cases"); Frederick
Schauer, Too Hard: Unconstitutional Conditions and the Chimera of Constitutional
Consistency, 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 989, 990 (1995) (claiming that the problem of the
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions is "intractable"); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Un-
constitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1415, 1416 (1989) (characterizing the
doctrine as "riven with inconsistencies").
13 Cf. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) (protecting non-civil-service sheriff's
employees who were threatened with discharge because they were not affiliated with
the Democratic Party); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (protecting a
public school teacher from being fired for writing a newspaper letter critical of the
Board of Education); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958) (invalidating a Califor-
nia statute granting a property tax exemption to veterans on the condition that they
swear a loyalty oath).
54 Cf Baker, supra note 52, at 1230 (noting that the Supreme Court has upheld
state statutes providing free medical benefits to indigent pregnant women on the con-
dition that they not have an elective abortion); Rosenthal, supra note 52, at 1125-26
(explaining that conditions may be upheld if they are relevant to a federal spending
program or if they could have been enacted directly pursuant to some other constitu-
tional power); Sullivan, supra note 52, at 1437 (discussing Wyman v. James, 400 U.S.
309 (1971), in which the Court rejected the claim that the government infringes on
Fourth Amendment rights when it conditions receipt of Aid to Families with Depen-
dent Children on the recipients' submission to warrantless residential searches).
5 See Kreimer, supra note 52, at 1296-97 (arguing that constraints may be necessa-
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the distribution of political and economic power were equal, but with un-
equal distributions we are more suspicious. The same might be said
about employment relationships; perhaps we have social norms that are
opposed to employer-initiated demotions but not to corresponding initia-
tives proposed by the less well-endowed employee. In the constitutional
context, however, we are unimpressed by the identity of the offeror. The
idea might be that we accept some baseline of rights and then question
bargains that threaten to move a politically weak party below this base-
line. Courts might well permit the government to buy or exchange a par-
cel of land in return for giving the seller free billboard space in which to
broadcast his or her ideas, but courts would be most unlikely to allow the
government to sell land in return for the buyer's agreement to cut back
on political speech or to refrain from voting. Thus, the government can
bargain with its superior endowments, just not in certain ways. This view
of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine does not, however, illuminate
other bargains that are unsuitable for reasons of community. Although
the government can exploit its superior bargaining position in dealing
with outsiders who wish to immigrate, constraints prevent it from bifur-
cating the citizenry. Moreover, the immigration and university admission
contexts are so similar that there appears to be something more than gov-
ernmental power at stake.
An alternative approach is to say that we deny the government the
advantage of its "possession" of things we call constitutional rights.56 The
government does not really own a citizen's right to speak, vote, or be free
of intrusive drug tests, nor does it own the right to determine the number
of citizens; it simply controls aspects of these things as a kind of interme-
diary. It therefore should not be able to improve its position by bargain-
ing with them. This approach, however, comes uncomfortably close to
the well-known and much-maligned right-privilege distinction,57 and is
unhelpful with regard to other admissions systems.
A very different approach views the doctrine of unconstitutional condi-
ry when the government buys, sells, and bribes with admittedly legitimate powers);
see also Epstein, supra note 52, at 102-03 (pointing out that "[limits on the types of
gains that the state can hope to extract by bargaining with its citizens can limit the
social losses associated with strategic behavior").
56 See Baker, supra note 52, at 1216 (noting that "one does not, of course, actually
buy from the government permission to engage in a constitutionally protected activi-
ty").
61 See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 781 (2d
ed. 1988) (noting that the idea that the government can always withhold conditionally
that which it can withhold altogether has been repudiated repeatedly since the mid-
twentieth century); William W. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Dis-
tinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968) (arguing that the right-
privilege distinction lost its meaning as the government increased its involvement in
the private sector).
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tions as directed against political logrolling.5" If one legislative minority
favored more drug testing and a different minority favored higher welfare
payments, the two groups could combine into a majority coalition by link-
ing their two goals. Similarly, one minority may prefer more immigration
and another may simply prefer a new source of revenue, so that the two
could combine on a plan to subject new immigrants to a special, higher
income tax. In some sense, such logrolls are simply bargains that our
private law training has taught us to exalt, making it is hard to see why
restricting the domain of bargains is desirable. However, we can draw
analogies between bargains among interest groups or politicians and bar-
gains among thieves. If A specializes in scoping out rich people who have
unattended diamonds or children, and B specializes in stealing them, we
would hardly expect our legal system to encourage or enforce bargains
between A and B that sought to profit from the pooling of their skills.
Similarly, the more one thinks that political coalitions externalize costs or
overpower other disorganized voters by setting the legislative agenda, the
more one will prefer minimizing legislative linkages. Among the many
structural means or precommitments available to this end are familiar
tools such as the line-item veto, which weakens coalitions by leaving them
unsure that their packages will rise or fall as they intend, and the single-
subject rule, which discourages alliances by requiring that votes be taken
on one subject at a time.59 The single-subject strategy is of course full of
imperfections,6" but the immediate point remains that the unconstitution-
al conditions doctrine can be seen as its close relative. At its most subtly
optimistic, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is an attempt by
courts to screen multiple-subject bills and reject those that seem the prod-
uct of certain unfortunate, undemocratic alliances.
The quick description of this last strand of unconstitutional conditions
thinking is enough to suggest that it is this thread, or view, that is most
closely related to the unsuitability of community-threatening bargains.
We might see an immigration bill that admitted more immigrants but had
them pay higher taxes as the product of a bargain between domestic man-
ufacturers eager for low-cost labor and domestic interests that expected a
portion of the revenue generated by these higher taxes, at the expense of
the politically unorganized majority of the citizenry. A court concerned
58 See Epstein, supra note 52, at 14 (arguing that bargains should not be enforced
when they create joint gains for the contracting parties but contemplate the use or
threat of coercion or fraud against third parties).
59 See Richard Briffault, The Item Veto in the State Courts, 66 TEMPLE L. REV.
1171, 1175-81 (1993) (explaining the use of the line item veto); Clayton P. Gillette,
Expropriation and Institutional Design in State and Local Government Law, 80 VA. L.
REV. 625, 657-70 (1994) (discussing the pros and cons of single-subject requirements).
60 It is difficult to draft a rule that permits voting on subjects that are necessarily
linked to one another but that removes the ability of legislative partners to solidify
the enforcement of their agreements with single-bill logrolling.
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about logrolls among organized interests at the expense of silent majori-
ties might work to find such legislation unacceptable. Specifically, it is
plausible that courts look for bargains among minority interest groups as
well as for bargains that contradict communitarian sensibilities, and that
judicial intervention is to be expected when both of these features are
present.
This theory about good and bad political bargains is akin to that in
antitrust law regarding price discrimination. Some price discrimination is
welfare-enhancing, while some reflects and enhances monopoly power.
There are arguments for banning all such discrimination, for permitting it
all, and for asking courts or other regulators to examine all instances on a
case-by-case basis. This antitrust example suggests that the unconstitu-
tional conditions doctrine reflects the notion of examining many political
bargains, as reflected in a certain kind of packaging of legislative grants
along with constraints, and, in a case-by-case manner, striking some down
as undesirable. Some "political discrimination" or nonegalitarian
schemes are thus barred. In the immigration context, for example, there
is more opportunity for political discrimination and dealmaking because
the legislature can attach more conditions to immigration rights. If courts
find distinctions that apply only to new citizens or certain visa holders
unacceptable, their decisions will indicate, in these terms, the existence of
a constraint on suspect political bargains.6 '
A similar concern about bargains and "discrimination" may explain the
institutional or cultural disinclination to make universities more internal-
ly competitive. A norm requiring universities to treat all departments or
students "alike" may save more in suppressing antisocial rent-seeking
among constituents within a university than it costs in missed opportuni-
ties to raise revenues or encourage various forms of behavior. For exam-
ple, if all universities were to abide by these norms, they could constrain
the cost of failing to charge physics majors more than history students.
I regard this connection that runs through unconstitutional conditions,
between the uncertainty about the desirability of certain bargains and in-
stances in which the interests of community appear to preclude certain
bargains, as fragile. However, even if it does no more than suggest that
part of what makes certain bargains unsuitable is the likelihood that they
are the product of undemocratic or otherwise undesirable alliances, it of-
fers a new perspective on various legal and cultural norms.
III. CONTINGENT CONTRACTS AND COMMUNITIES
(ANCIENT AND MODERN)
Cultural norms are often more difficult to discern than are legal doc-
trines. With respect to unsuitable bargains, for example, a judicial deci-
sion that invalidates a political bargain in the form of some piece of legis-
61 Suspect, that is, under some normative views of desirable democracy.
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lation is more concrete than an inference drawn from the fact that we do
not find employers or politicians or universities making certain kinds of
offers. Nevertheless, I have hinted that the most interesting kind of com-
munity-oriented unsuitability is that which arises or evolves as an un-
stated norm. The practical side of this claim is that when we puzzle over
the apparent failure of parties to reach certain bargains, we might enter-
tain the possibility that some community-reinforcing function is at issue.
Consider, by way of distant example, the biblical story of Joshua and
the Gibeonites.62 Joshua was Moses's successor, and the Book bearing his
name chronicles his campaign to wipe out the preexisting residents of
what the Bible calls the promised land. After several gory chapters, the
residents of a place called Gibeon, having learned of Joshua's early and
nearby victories at Jericho and elsewhere, were understandably con-
cerned for their survival. Disguising themselves with tattered clothes and
stale food in order to masquerade as travelers from some distant place,
the Gibeonites went to Joshua and suggested a treaty or alliance.63 Josh-
ua had been instructed to wipe out all residents of the promised land,64
and the Gibeonites surmised that if they could fool him into thinking they
were from a distant place, he might regard them as potential allies rather
than as competitors for his promised land. Although Joshua was suspi-
cious of their place of origin, their smooth talk and appropriate props
caused him to swear as they suggested and to sign on the dotted line.65
Joshua discovered the Gibeonites' fraud three days later, but regarded his
people as bound by his incautious treaty.66 The most he could do was to
condemn the Gibeonites to menial labor.67
The modern lawyer has two reactions to this story. The first is puzzle-
ment over Joshua's disinclination to regard the treaty as fraudulently in-
duced and therefore void.68 However, we too are accustomed to vener-
able agreements that cannot be voided even when critical facts have been
withheld. A marriage is not necessarily voidable simply because one par-
ty was dishonest about his or her previous personal or medical history.69
62 Joshua 9:3-27.
63 Id. 9:3-6.
64 Id. 1:3-6.
65 Id. 9:12-15.
66 Id. 9:16-21.
67 Id. 9:22-27.
68 Concerning the treatment of fraud in treaty negotiation, see the Vienna Conven-
tion on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 49, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 344, which
codifies the customary law of agreement between States that if a State has been in-
duced to conclude a treaty by the fraudulent conduct of another negotiating State, the
induced State may invoke the fraud as invalidating its consent to be bound by the
treaty.
69 The problem is, of course, more interesting in a jurisdiction or era in which di-
vorce is not readily available. For a sampling of such cases, see KEEZER ON THE LAW
OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE § 221 (John W. Morland ed., 3d ed. 1946).
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A sitting President suddenly discovered to be underage might not be au-
tomatically removable, and legislation signed by this President would
surely not be void.7" There is even the case of Fletcher v. Peck,7 in which
the Supreme Court held land conveyances by the Georgia legislature,
found later to have been corrupt, irreversible. The permanence of some
legal rituals is thus a recognizable concept, although we would not expect
another legal system, especially one in place thousands of years ago, to
have precisely the same stripes of permanence.
Another biblical example of unconditional relationships is the story of
Isaac's attempt to bless his first-born son, Esau.72 While Esau was out
preparing as instructed for the big event, Jacob appeared, masquerading
as his brother, Esau.73 Although Isaac was suspicious of the voice he
heard, he was fooled by Jacob's woolly costume and proceeded to bless
Jacob as his first-born son.74 Although Isaac later discovered the decep-
tion, it could not be undone under the rules of the game.7" Similarly,
Jacob, who toiled seven years for Laban's daughter Rachel, was fraudu-
lently married first to her sister Leah.76 Again, there was no suggestion
that the marriage could have been voided after the fact, no hint that Ja-
cob could force Laban to perform as he knew Jacob had expected, and
only the possibility that Jacob's misfortune balanced his earlier gain from
the analogous deception of Isaac. Our legal system might have remedied,
or at least undone, all three of these transactions, but inasmuch as there
are other serious missteps that we would not undo, Joshua's predicament
is not entirely foreign to us.
It is, however, a second modern reaction to the Gibeonites' duping of
Joshua that is most relevant to the discussion of unsuitable bargains and
unconditional relationships. It would seem that Joshua was rash and bad-
ly advised. If his legal system did not allow mistake or fraud to undo
contracts, his failure to make the treaty explicitly conditional on the truth
of the Gibeonites' story seems inept. Similarly, Isaac should have made
his blessing conditional on the correct identity of the supplicant before
him, and Jacob should have been less trusting of Laban and should have
entered into a more specific conditional contract.
One tempting response to this second reaction is that the repeated fail-
ure of the leading characters in the Bible to plan ahead suggests that con-
tingency contracts were unknown or unthinkable to early drafters. But
that is simply not the case. In the Book of Joshua itself, just a few chap-
70 Insufficient years would surely be more likely to lead to a presidential candi-
date's removal from the ballot than from the office itself.
71 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
72 Genesis 27:1-40.
73 Id. 27:3-19.
74 Id. 27:21-23.
75 Id. 27:33.
76 Id. 29:18-28. Bridal veils were apparently quite opaque in those days.
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ters before the Gibeonite episode, we find Joshua's spies investigating
Jericho and hiding in the house of Rahab.77 She offers them refuge and
then a method of escape in return for their promise to spare her and her
family during the invasion, and they agree to the deal.78 Three times in
the course of a few verses the spies remind Rahab that the deal would be
off if she reneged, turned them in, or gave away their pending attack.79
Joshua's agents come across as a great deal more sophisticated than their
leader, and we see that contingent contracts were indeed available in that
world. The proximity of these two stories reveals the character of Joshua
as too rash for anyone's good. Even in the presence of low transaction
costs, Joshua appears to have missed a useful bargain.
By thinking about communitarianism and unsuitable bargains, howev-
er, we can see Joshua as competent but constrained by the links between
contracts and community. The spies' deal with Rahab of Jericho was
merely a one-shot contract that was easily made conditional. On the oth-
er hand, ceremonies regarding marriage, international alliances, and dy-
nastic succession are things that cultures or legal systems might regard as
permanent and sculpted in a way not amenable to modification by mere
bargains. Their permanence is about relationships and communities.
Thus, Isaac's blessing, Jacob's marriage, and Joshua's treaty needed, per-
haps, to be unconditional. The permanence of these relationships is
analogous to our own conceptions of marriage, citizenship, and even
membership in a university community. The analogy is limited, however,
because our marriages are impermanent and our admissions or gatekeep-
ing rules have more to do with communities' egalitarian norms than per-
manence norms.8" But the analogy does serve to make the point that a
variety of bargains appear unsuitable because they are destructive of
community. The unsuitability of bargained-for modifications to arrange-
ments can add value to these arrangements or relationships. Joshua, like
Isaac, Jacob, and modern politicians, may have been rash, for he could
have delayed the process of acceptance and inclusion in order to investi-
gate the facts, but his story serves as a reminder of the place of uncondi-
tional, which is to say unbifurcated, relationships.
CONCLUSION
I have tried to suggest that law and customary norms reflect our intu-
itions about the value of bonds and community. Certain bargains are un-
acceptable, or even unimagined, because they are inconsistent with our
intuitions about unconditional relationships. At the same time, I have
77 Joshua 2:1-7.
78 Id. 2:12-14.
79 Id. 2:14-20.
80 We do not, for instance, disapprove strongly of students who transfer from one
university to another.
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argued that the fuzzy feelings we often associate with communities and
other unconditional relationships should not blind us to the idea that
arms' length bargains in both the private and public arenas may be supe-
rior to our socially constructed communitarianism. We may get a warm
feeling when we do not maximize our profits from the sale of citizenship
slots to willing immigrants, but in reality we may be freezing many for-
eigners in their present surroundings. My central claim is that we are less
enamored of bargains and more communitarian than we first think, but a
secondary observation is that our communitarian instincts tend to privi-
lege the interest groups we know. In contrast, unfettered bargains often
privilege those far away in political space, who may be poorly endowed,
so that in a counterintuitive way our communitarian sensibilities are
sometimes selfish ones. My aim, however, has been more positive than
normative, and in this regard I think it clear that some constraints on
bargains support the egalitarian or permanence norms of communities
and that, in effect, we decide that some relationships ought to be precom-
mitted to unconditionally.
I have not tried to suggest a theory of the origin of the social norms
described here. Egalitarian or permanence norms might be described as
offering some functional advantages, but an easy case can be made for the
nearly opposite idea that bargains and avoidance mechanisms prove su-
perior in evolutionary terms. My intuition is that there is room for varie-
ty on this matter, and that it is even possible that the superior pattern in
functional terms is for a social and legal system to adopt one or the other
approach. Unconditional relationships and unfettered contracting may
offer distinct advantages, but either may be superior to a norm that vacil-
lates between these two positions with no default preference. Highly
competitive environments may be unable to support egalitarian norms,
but more protected cultures may, but need not, sustain such norms in the
form of selected, unconditional relationships. It is the sometimes puz-
zling presence of these norms that I have explored in suggesting that our
legal system may be more communitarian than first appears.
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